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T H 1 R I G H T S O F A s TJ I P P SR I- A B I L L
0 T? L A 1 i G.
Some monI,-, ago 7vfile en1iaged in 0hiioing wofl from
different points within this state, I fiund more or less
dif-'icult-r in obtaini i- bills of lading which were not
so encumbered by clauses relievin- the carrier fro]a all
liability in case off loss, as to render the drawing of
sights drafts upon them al'ost impossible. This has
led me into a consideration o- the rigt-s which a snippev
hAas in demanding a bill of lad-n,, what cntracts he may
or :,%tT not rake, and the effect of such contracts.
But be'Tore ta:in; u- tnese questions, per-aps it will
be best to ascertain the 'duties of the carrier. It will
not, however, be neces:arJ for our purpose to consider
who are co--,ion c. r-iers and who are not, simply tost t
that in reneral railroad zo-xalnies are held to be co ilr1-o
carriers,(Hutchinson on Carriers, 3ec. 67; Southwestern
R. -H. Co. vs..'ebb, 43 Ala. 535.; I. 3. R.R. Co. vs Frank-
linberg, 54 Ill. 88; Thonias vsB. & P. R. . .o., 10 li~et.
472.) ad that they are so c-onsidered in this state.
(Root vs. areat West. Co., 45 I. Y. 524) And that as
such, at common law, the railtoad company is made an in-
surer of the goods intrusted to it against all risk of
loss or i-ijuvy except as caused 0,T the act of -od, the
iublic enemy, or the act of the owner of the goods.
It is also necessary that the car-,ier should receive
all goods of'ered,if' the shi-per on-'orm to all reason-
able re Eulation, this in fact is sometimes :v-.de the test
as to whether the pa2-;j is a common carrier or aot.(Pied-
mont 1,f,. Co. vs. J. c r. --I a. Co., 19 S.C. 353) In
>lcmillan vs. M. S. 3 N. I. R. R . Co. (16 Mich. 79) Jus-
tice Cooley says "a comm'non carrier has no right to refuse
3oods of 7ered -for carriage at the proper time and place
on tender of the usual and reasonable coniensation, un-
less the owner will consent to Ais receivin them under
a reduced liability: and the owner can insist on his re-
ceiringT the goods under all the 2'isks and resp'onsibilities
which the law annexes to his employment". This iooint
was definitely decided in the .,case of the New nE. Ex. CgO
against Me. Cent. R. R. Co. ( 57 Me. 188). -,ere the de-
fendent made a contract to allow the Eastern _x. Co. to
have certain space in *vie of its cars to car, express
matter. The plaintif"' -ve notice that he wished to
send express acka-es over the defendant road and o'fered
to pay for the )rivilePe. Packag;es were presented to de-
fendant but were refused transportation. Plaintiff'
brings this action for damages for such r.fusal. The
courts held in favor of the jlaintif ' and in the course
of the opinio-1 said, "Coaon carriers -ire oound to carry
indifferently within the usual range of their business
for a reasonable corainsation, all f'reight offered and
all passengers who may apply".
3ut while the carrier is bound to receive for trans-
portation all goods offered at a reasonable place and
;I'ich are within his line of business, still he can de-
mand of the shipper the payment of freight in advance.
(Stor-7 on Bailments, 3ec. 508; Allen vs: Cape -ear and Y.
R. R. Co., 6 S. 1. 105; Fitch vs. Newbur?:, 1 Daugl. 1)
The amount of such freight may be agreed uon b}j s-pecial
contract, but in the absence o-' any such a-ree vent theg:r
carrier is entitled to a reasonable reward, which is as-
certained b-r tAe amount comnonly, or custo:1arily paid for
other lihe services. (?he L. . 't. L. A. R. Co. vs.
WVilson, 119 Ind. 352)
The question iight now arise as to whether the car-
rier can charge different rates for diffeerent persons.
On this the courts seeA to hold, that to maintain an
action for darar.es due to an pqualityr in the rates charr-
ed by a carrier, the par-y co-lainin,- must prove thot
he has paid an unreasonably lagge price which has worked
to his harm. "A reasonable price paid by such a party
is not made unreasonable by a les- price paid by others."
So while the carrier cannot discriminate between differ-
ent shippers and charge one --iore than it does the others
under like circumstances still it may charge one less than
it charges the other when it is for its advantage and
not inconsistent with the public interest and based on
a sufficient reason. ( Rapan vs. Aiken, 42 A e. p. 604:
-.itchburh I. Go.vs. Gage, 12 Gray 398; Spofbord vs.
Boston & Me. A. 1-., 123 Mass. 326)
';e often find it laid down, that the carrier can
li,,it his co-vnon law liability. In a sense that is
true, but the statement is perhaps a little nvisleadinz.
This is not an ex parte action even though actual prac-
tice may indicate the contrary. "The carrier cannot
himself restrict his liability at all; that liability is
imposed by law, "ad t Ie utmost that the law pe22ilts is
that the eriloyer ,wla;, when he deems oAPO his advantage,
bD7 special contract release the cuIrier frm a -ortion
o~f U at liability which -he law would otherwise impose
unon hi-ii." (1,lich. cent. 1. . CQ. I. ale, 6 lioi. 243)
AVnd 'or this reason it is further held that the car rier
cannot restrict his liability by merely ;..T,- a gen-
eral notice to the public li~itiW his obligation which
, =J. . ,'t !lv s
may or -iay not be asnented, to. (f t N7t av, C;. vs.
1,1erchants Banik, 6 :'ow. 343; Blossom vs. :odd, 43 !1. Y.264;
Perry vs. Thompson, 98 Hass. 252)
As to the extent to which the carrier can thus llinit
h-is liability we find the rule as laid down in iailroad
Co. vs. Lockwood (17 "71all.357) to be, that the exemtions
claimed by the carrier mst be reas-nable and just and
"that every attempt of carriers by eneral notices of
special contract to excuse themselves for losses or i-i i
ages resultin, in ny de,7ree from their ovn want of care
Pnd faithfulness" or that of their servants wilL be con-
sidered against rood faith and contrary to law. rIhi, is
the rule as followed generally in the different states.
However, New Yorh has so extended it as to allow a car-
riers to liihit hin liability for negli,,ence, but this
must be by a special co--i- act and noatin reneral ter-is.
(M~nard vs. R;y.acuse,,cR R. Co., 71 N. Y. 180; '7ilson
vs. R. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 87).
Hence it follows that as a shiper, the railroad
comiany is bound to redeive my goods when delivered at
the cars and to transport themu ,)on payrmient of freight
if demanded, and that I need not take a bill of lading
containing any contract which will exeunt the carrier from
his corTnon law liability. But now suppose the carrier
refuse to -ive me such a 'bill of lading, can I demand
it? Can I demand a bill containing only such limita-
tions as I :y desire?
In tle first place what is a bill of lading? It is
a "written acknowledgement by a carrier of the recei-pt
of certain goods nd an agreement for a consideration
to transport and to deliver the same at a specified 2lac-
to a person therip named ov to his order." (Poiter on
Bills. of Ladin;, 3ec. l) A definition to about the
sane effect is given by W. Justice Clifford in t-e
. A
Delaware (14 '1-Ial1. 579.). Thus it is both a recei3t
and a contract (Pollard vs. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7).
Oiiinallr a bill of lading wa used onlj in case
of transportation fr water but later it caiLe to be a
ter-A equally a-plicable to receipts iven by carriers
by either land or water,. , carrier's receipt is ,ener-
ally held to be a bill of lading ( ,crace vs. Adaris, 100
Mass. 505; .Uirkland vs. Dinsmore, 62 :1. Y, 171), as is
also a warehouse receipt(Davis vs. Russel, 52 Cal. 611).
"But whatever the form, if the instrument delivered by
the carrier to the ship)e- contain language sufficient
to show that the carrier agrees with the shipper to
transport certain goods therein described from one place
tb another for a consideration therein specified, the
instrument will be a bill of ladJ-v<' (Wneeler on the
Modern Law of Carriers, 288).
As a receipt it is only prima f:acie evidence, that
the carrier has received the oods, it is in the nature
of a receiot "so far as the quantity and condition o
the goods is concerned, and as such is open to expilana-
tion or even contri:tiction by parol proof" (ilutciinson
on Carriers, sec. 122; 'he Dclaware, 14 J-ull. 601; The
Lady Iran-lin, 8 Wall. 325). In an action a ;ainst a
carrier for loss ol", or injury to the goods, the burden
of -roof is u-oon hi.-i to show that the !goo.sT were not as
ieecribed in the bill of lading and that he was thus de-
ceived when he signed it (Bissel vs. price, 16 ill. 408).
It ;i iht be well to notice here an exception in New York
to the general Joctpine, i.e. in this state the cou;rts
have held that even if7 jooods had never been delivered
to the ca-rier, he is N estopped f-nii denying te receipt
of the roods if a bill of ladin.: has been issued for
the.n by an authorized agent acti nW wihin the scope of
his authority(Arinour vs. R. R. Co., 65 ,. Y. 111)
But in so far as it is a contract, in the absence of
fraud or uistake it cannot be varied by parol or other
extrinsic evidence, nor can it be varied b:r evidence of
prior negot-ations which were :erged in the written con-
tract (Collander vs. Dinisore, 55 -. 7. 200; idewttt vs.
, 3. Q. - .R o 6 l Ia. 611). till a ')arol arpree-
ment -s not ch:ned by cont:ary statements made in a bill
of ladin; issued after the goods have been -iipped(Bost-
v+ic:: vs. Balti+I:re 'I . - . 45 1. . 712 w vs.
Pac. !Aail t K._ Jo 106 N. ". 206). Not on!:, is
this tlhe rule i overns the contracts ex-)ressed in
the bill o.7 ladLn, but it has been held to be the rule
as tr the il-ilied contrcts. Thus where goods are to
oe shi'med beyond tie i:itial carrier'B lihe,tt is under-
stood that such is to select the usual or a reas-
onably direct and safe route inles,- a particular route
is mentioned in the bill of lading. "in such a case
the bill o7 ladin.? being sil.ent iul res-ect to the line
by which the 1oods are to be forwarded, its ef'ect is the
sanme as if a 3)rovision were therein iniserted that the car-
rier s-ivuld have .he:riht to select a-6 his liscretion
any customary or usual route whiich wa- regarded as sfe
and responsible. '2his provision being thus imvoted
into the co.tract by law, is as unascailable ')v ?arol
as any of the other, expressed terniis of the co-ntract"(Snol'
vo. o- , 109 !!,id. 422; -inckl:v . R , 'o., 56
A* Y. 429).
Such a bill o. ladin, we cla/qi the shippe? can doelani
of tlie cgrrier, And this ri-t we claili on the -round of
custom 'hat it is the custom for the cariier t,) -ive
the shipmper a bill o <? lading, which shall state the wei-it
or quantity of the ?eods received and shall e-idence any
contract which the carier may have made wit i the shipi-er
in re-ard to the transportation o7 the 7oods. "
tracts or conventions, bind the parties not only by their
words but to all which is demanded by the nature of the
contract, by the law and by customa, unless these conse-
quences are expresnly excluded"(The Mayflower, 3 hare 300).
The statutes of this state make a Dersopiable to iraq.
prisonment for three years ot a fine of $3000 or both
for frAudulently ;aking a false bill of lading(Penal Code
Sec. 577), and a year's imprisonment or a fine of 1000
or both for issuing a fictitious bill of lading (Penal
Code, Sec. 628). Then too, the statute in regard to ship-
ping goods by canal requires that "Svery master of a boat,
conveying property on a canal, shall exhibit to the sev-
eral collectors ----- --- a just and true account,
or bill of lading of such 3roperty, si;ned by hinsell and.
the consignor" whici shall contain a description, the
weight, &c. of the property shipped (Rev. -tat. 756, Sec.
121).
So we see that it is a universal custom reco ;nized
by the legislature, by the courts and by business men all
over the country,that the carrier u-,?o,- receipt of the
,oods should give the shipper a bill of lading. Fol-
lowing this custom, it has become the general practice -
-or a shiy-er in drawin, a draft 1i -aV.iLent for his roods
to a-ta2A ti'_e ili of Iadin, so that as a eneral rule,
unless the ;oods ha.e been receivedthe consi,-nlee will
not accen)t a draft without the bill of ladin:; att-, c.ed.
Suppose no;.' the carrier unjus=;lgf refuses to ,ive a bill
of lading, and the ship)er is oblig-ed to wait uintil the
consignee has received the goods before the draft will
be acce-sted - evidently :ie may suffer serious injury as
the iiesult for which- tne carrier alone is in fault aand
for whic-h the car-.ier alone should be held "liable.
In Texas this question has been settled by the -as-
sa-rc of a)3tatute requirin co,m-on carriers, ".ihen-hey
receive ;oodQ for trans--ortatioi, to ;ive to the hi-
perp when it is demanded, a bill of ladin- or memorandum
in writin- statinA the quantity, character, order and
condit ion o2 the Poods", and "in case of their refu-al
to exec,te a nd deliver a bill of ladi-a or 'e'ii.au -;q in
writing] as above required, tneio shall be liable to a
ia nlty o ' not less than Lve no., .ore t>.aen five hundred
,,,o liars"(3ayla=, £e:as Civil t Art. 280). And this,
too, is in a state where the coll, car iew. cannot re-
strict his co.tinn law liabi ity in any m.ner whatever
(Sayles OCivil Stat. ,Ailt. 278) and nence where the bill
of ladin-; must be al;inost solely in the nature of a re-
ceipt.
Je are aware of a decision i 3 Massachusetts apparnntly
in conflict with this doctrine. This is the case of
Johnson vs. Stoddard(lO0 Mass. 306) in which goods were
shipped from iHaverhill, Mass. to Boston b-r rail and thence
by water to Chatleston, S. C. The bill of lading was
refused by the railroad company but one was -riven by the
master of the ship. In the decision of the case the
court said ",V1e know no rule o, the cormuon law and no
provision of statute which requires a railroad company to
give bills of lading. When such companies transport
goods in connection with carriers by sea, it may be a
convenient and poer arrangement; but it can only be
made essential by contract or custom". Now we claim
this case does not disturb the position we have taken,
wli ch ed
since upon the trial evidence was intt.o uced t, though
A
formerly it was customary for the carrier in the state
of Masnachusetts to give tlie shipper- a bill of lad-
ing, that since 1863, in order to avoid the expense of
the internal revenue stamp, such had not been the custom.
In suo)ort of our )nsition we havc first the case of
The peytona(2urt.21). 'hs was a case in which hides
were shipped by the above schooner, they 'ere )iJaced on
deck ncldi some were jettisoned .hile others were v.Um'-1hed
ove-boa2d. The shi-pper had presIited the master with a
bill.. oif ladil:v for hira to sian, but he -ut hima off say-
ing he wo-,ld sign it late r and i n "f1. 7,1 sailed without
givifl; an? bill of lading whatever. In an ac-ion :for
damages the court says, "U-)o- a ohi u.nt bein; "cade, it
is an lvication of law, in the absence of a s'ecial con-
tIact, that the ,.ster is to sign bills of lading in
the usual forry]". The court in the same decision scys
furt'.ier, "Now though it is, I thinh, usual to present
bills of lading to the m stets of vessels for signa-u-e,
and ordinarily, it is not encumbent on them to selek out
consiors ,;-.id si1 them at teir places of business,
yet ka bill of ladin, is the custonar and propeir shi--
pin document,and shnuld be signed by t:e roaster before
sailing".
,ain, there is the case of the ivay "lowe'(- ,'-o '300)
vzich we thins is di-ec ly ilpoint. In t is case A
hired the iold o ,-- ship in which to cariT ice Cromr New
York to New Orleans. lie claims he a.reed to pay
910,00o as freight, but B,admittin; this claims if the
weight exceeded a&cert&in amount, A was to pay ,9.75
per ton. The weight exceeded the stipulated amount.
A demanded an ordinary bill of ladin ; stating the amount
of freight as 'l1,000, this B refused to give but offered
one fixing the freight as he understood it. In an action
by B for the freight, the court held in his favor on the
ground th-t he was not obliged to give -. bill of lading
stating the amount of freijg P., a less price than he uni
derstood it. But the counsel for B.claiied that nothing
was said in the contract about a bill of ladin#.nd so
he was not obliged t3 give one. Upon thii, point the
court says, "Almost all our mercantile law is the mere
adoption by the.courts, of the custom of rerohants". As
a result of this "when the owner a ;reed to ,ar-ry the ice,
he bound hims0elf just as rnmch to ;ive a receipt for it,
with ,the promise tV deliver it in the usual terms as he
did to carry it. Such a rec'-ipt and iromise is just
as. much exoecte 1 by the master as the shippr. It is
included by the co-anon un'derstanding in t e general
contract. My opinion, therefore, is that a bill of
lading to this effedt he was bound by the contract to
_ive".
,o far we find that tht shielder can demand a bill
od lading, but what now mustet contain? UJiless the
quantity r wei ght of the goods is i-n sorhe manner sttted
so thathie ct.rier can be aeld in case of loss it is of
very little value. Upon this point we find in th'e lop-.
inion Of the case just cited the followuing statemtent,
"It is of the essence of a bill of lading, that it con-
tains a receipt "for the -oods with a promise to carry
and deliver them, for this the master promises and it
necessarily contains nothing more".
As to what is necessary irstating the quantity of the
goods which is required by a receipt , we find a decision
in the case of the Texas and P. 1. R. C. vs. Cute-man (14
W. 1069). This case arose unde2 the Texas statute
which requires the carrier to :ive a bill of lading'stat-
in,-r the quantity J:c. of the goods. C shipped by this
railroad a carload of lumber but the agent of the company
refuded to ;ive the weig t in the bill of lading, and it
is for such refusal that C brigns this action to recover
the penalty as provided by the statute. TIe court held
that C was entitled to the penalty and it further said
that, "In the case of lumber quantity might be ascertained
-certainty b r v7asurement or b- weight. 7reight
c ~a ' *es by railroads are regulated byi weight and the
)rryo) - - wt, to ascertailt e quantity of l-xaber to be
trins-,orted is to weigh it and this should be !one and
the weight stated in the bill of laJiin;."
.hile it is well settled that, in the absence of
statutes )ills of lai-tc not J e--tiable still we
fin:l that the- are assimilable. But they diC'fer from
otner contracts a,1ihich are .eely assiMnable, in that
they represent the ,property To-. which they ave given,
and sc "the endorsement and delivery of a bill of ladin
tran-fers the m)ro, ert: from the vendor to the vendee:
is a complete legal delivery of the ,loods: divests the
vendor's lien" , though the assignee -ets -o, -,reater 4
other rights than the assi;nor haRd( Benj. on ti.s , -)ec.
813; Zutchinson on Jarriers, Sec. 129).
Fo- ,* ihis reasin the cons±i;nee usually accepts a draft
in -ay7,,ent of -oods Uon re ceipt of the oill of ladin-.
In such a case under t'.i ordi:-i u bill, the consignee
ias a r-ight of actiDn a;ainst the ca-rier in case of loss
oiL the roods and the bill of lading is presuLvr-tive evi-
dence %,ainst h2i,7 as to their wei-ht and ,Thzc K-jtion.
But now whst will be the effect in case the clause is
inser tf,dl after thu statement as to the quantity of goods
received, "according to shipper s weight and tally"? This
of course ii inserted by the carrier to shift the burden
of proot upon the claimant in case of loss; does it :-.ive
that effect?
As to this particular cl-,use we are not aware of any
decision directly in point, so we can only be uided by
the interpretation which the courts have given other
similar clauses. Such a case we find where the descrip-
tion of the goods is limited by the wnrds "contents un--
known". Upon this Point it has been held in England
that the insertion o' the words "contaeits Unknown" ren-
dered a bill of lading of no value as a declaration as
to the goods and hence of no value as evidence (Haddow vs.
Parry, 3 Taunton 303).
A well known case on this point in New York is that
of i iller vs. H. & 3t. J. R. R. Co. (90 -. Y. 430). Here
the plaintiff paid a draft upon the recei)t of a bill of
lading7 callin- for "thirty bbls. eggs"t . Printed in the
bill were the wurds "conten** and value unknown". The
barrels were found to contain sawdust instead of eggs and
hence tl.e action against the carrier for the amount of
the draft. The General Term (24 Hun 607) held in favor
of the pllantiff on the , 'ound that the written words vi i
-ust control the ri-.ited 1"contrnts m'L<no1,n ' referred
simply to the conditin- or quality of the e-gs and so the
carrier was estopled fr-,n denying t~i-.t the barrels con-
tained egs. But this decision wan reversed by the Court
of Ap-)eals for this reason:- That the construction df
the instru.mient as a whole .st be considered and any ap-
parentlk repugnant clauses be reconciled, thtt the carrier
cannot be regu.ed to intend to insert inconsistent oro-
visions and so one clause ust qualify the other,and
hence that lie iaade no representation as to the dontentu
of the oackages. "Its a:-,ent simply certified in effect
th-t they were described as containing e;,s, accompanying
this with the statement that tthe contents were not in
fact known1
Again we have the case of the Columbo( 3 Blatch. 521)
1It may not be out of place ri t here to say tht
porter in his work on Bills of Lading ( Sec4 57) com-
ments upon this case of Miller vs. !I. c t. j. j . If.
Co., but he gives as the law the decision of the General
Term, he does not seem to have discovered that the case
vas reversed by the Court of Appeals -'nd that, too, -five
yearsbefore his work aPm)eared..
Ill which the bill of lading in question contained the
words "weight and contents unknown". Here the court
said that the effect of this clause was that the carrier
made no admission as to the condition of tlhe goods be-
yond what was' visible to the eye or apparent from the
hzndling.:t And it further -leld that in case of a ques-
tion as to the condition -of the contentb that "The burden
rests upon the shipper to. prove the condition of the goods
at the time of shipment".
As a result of our examination of the cases we are
led to the conclusion that where the clause "weight and
contents unknown" or other similar exrression, is insert-
ed infthe bill of lading, that the burden of proof, as to
the weight and condition of the -oods at the time of de-
livery to the car ier rests upon t e hipper;that wlhile
the courts of this country may not go to the extent of
the 2n/pli7h courts, still instead of the shipper being
able si rl to introduce his bill of lading and rest his
case he may yet put in his bill of lading as evidence
feeling sure it will have some weight but knowing that it
must be supported by other evkidence (S epard :s. Naylor,
5 Gray 591; he California, 2 ";awyer 12; Schultz :s.S
Piet-o G, 40 Fed. 497; Iron Mountain . B.. /s. Knight;
122 U. "). 85).
Coiin) now to the end of ouv discussion, we ind
that in shi n r ool, I can compel the railroad company
to acce1)t the wool offeted and use reasonable care and
promptness in its transportation, though I may be obliged
to pay the freight in advande; that I can demand a bill
of lading, containing the weight and, quantituy of the wool
delivered and the railroad company is liable for dam-
a:es in case of a 'refusal; that I can demuand such a
bill itthout clauses limiting the carrier 4 s liability;
and lastly, that should I allow the insertion in the
bill of lading; of the clause "according to shippers weight
and tally", the result would be to shift upon rmself
the burden of proving the weight of the 'oods delivered.
